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Abstract 
The trend to later retirements and increased work for pay during retirement have been explained by longer 
life expectancies, better health at older ages, and declining pension coverage. Retirement surveys show 
current workers continue to push back retirement plans and increasing numbers plan to work for pay in 
retirement. Yet the fraction or retirees working for pay is substantially lower, and the age of retirement 
notably younger, than suggested by surveys. This apparent conundrum can be explained by lack of 
demand for the services for older workers, and the fact that future retirees are likely to experience 
retirement very differently than the current older generation. Current workers should factor uncertainty 
about labor market outcomes into their retirement planning. 
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Chapter 4
The Changing Nature of Retirement
Julia Coronado
Change is the only constant when it comes to retirement planning and
income provision over the 40 years since the 1974 passage of the US
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In 1979, most private
sector workers (82 percent) who were covered by a pension plan had a
deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan. By 2011, a minority (31 percent) had DB plans,
while deﬁned contribution (DC) plans, which did not exist in their current
form when ERISA was signed, became the only retirement coverage for 69
percent of private sector workers (EBRI 2014a). Changes in beneﬁt provi-
sion can only be partially linked to the passage of ERISA, since the public
sector, not covered by ERISA, has also seen changes in the structure of
retirement beneﬁt provision, albeit more gradual ones.
Many of these changes in the retirement landscape were driven by dem-
ography. In 1970, an average man reaching the age of 65 could expect to live
to 78.1 years of age, while a woman could expect to live to age 82. Forty years
later, a 65-year-old man could expect to live to 82.7 and a woman to 85.3, an
increase of 15–35 percent in the number of retirement years that needed to
be ﬁnanced, assuming retirement ages don’t change (CDC 2014). But times
have changed. Long-running surveys of people’s retirement plans and
experiences suggest a steady and substantial increase in their expected
retirement ages as well as changing plans to work for pay in retirement.
Yet these same surveys reveal a conundrum: large fractions of retirees, the
majority in recent years, report retiring earlier than planned, and the
fraction working in retirement is substantially below people’s plans. Either
individuals are so cautious that they oversave and ﬁnd themselves in a
surplus position at older ages (a view refuted by a large body of data and
research), or there is something else afoot.
This chapter argues that older workers have had a difﬁcult time executing
their plans, owing to persistently weak labor market conditions for older
employees. Many older workers have been forced into earlier retirement
than planned due to job loss, and many who seek work are unable to ﬁnd
employment or can only ﬁnd part-time jobs. While labor market conditions
have been difﬁcult for workers of all ages, older workers have a harder time
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 8/12/2015, SPi
ﬁnding another position once separated from a job. We conclude that
people should be factoring uncertainty about labor market outcomes into
their retirement planning decisions in addition to increased uncertainty
from exposure to risky investments.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe key ﬁndings from the Retirement Con-
ﬁdence Survey, the longest-running annual survey of retirement attitudes,
plans, and experiences. Next we corroborate these ﬁndings with evidence
on older households from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Results high-
light the different experiences and future prospects of different gener-
ations. A third section looks at labor force outcomes and decisions using
the Current Population Survey. Involuntary unemployment and under-
employment are not unique to older workers, but these come at a vulner-
able time in life. We conclude with some thoughts regarding implications
for policy and research.
Watch What I Say, Then What I Do
Since 1993, the Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute has surveyed a repre-
sentative sample of US current workers and retirees about attitudes and self-
reported decisions related to retirement in the Retirement Conﬁdence
Survey (RCS).1 It poses a core set of questions to cohorts over time to reveal
shifting trends in attitudes and decisions that can then be cross-checked with
other data sources (EBRI 2014b). For this reason, the RCS captures the
recent decline and partial rebound in Americans’ conﬁdence in their ability
to afford a comfortable retirement. Indeed, conﬁdence in retirement secur-
ity has fallen in recent years: the share of current workers either very or
somewhat conﬁdent in having the resources needed to live comfortably in
retirement hovered around 70 percent in the 1990s through 2007; then it
dropped sharply to just above 50 percent, before recovering to 55 percent in
2014. Among retirees, the high water mark was also in 2007 when 79 percent
were very or somewhat conﬁdent they had enough money to live comfort-
ably throughout their retirement years. This fell below 50 percent in the
crisis, hitting a trough at 47 percent in 2013 before rising somewhat to 57
percent in 2014.
It is striking that today’s retirees do not have much higher levels of
conﬁdence than do workers and that nearly half of them think their
resources will not last throughout retirement. Arguably, the potentially
depressive effect of the secular decline in DB pension coverage on retire-
ment conﬁdence was offset by rising equity and home values in recent
decades. Even though the equity market has more than fully recovered
losses registered during the ﬁnancial crisis, and home values in most parts
of the United States have also recovered well overall, the recent ﬁnancial
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market volatility has tangibly revealed to workers and retirees alike the risks
inherent in DC retirement vehicles.
The RCS captures a steady increase in the expected age of retirement
among current workers. Figure 4.1 indicates that the fraction of workers
expecting to retire after age 65 has risen steadily, from just over 10 percent
in 1991, to roughly one-third of respondents in recent years. The rising
trend has not been a function of business cycles or the ﬁnancial crisis;
rather, it likely reﬂects longer life expectancies, better physical health, and
a more service-oriented economy, as well as the declining prevalence of DB
pension plans with their strong incentives for earlier retirement. Neverthe-
less, Figure 4.1 also shows that plans for later retirement are not evident in
the share of people retiring post-65 (about 15 percent).
Some reasons for the gap between retirement plans and retirement
experience are provided in Figure 4.2. A fairly large proportion of retirees
exits the labor force earlier than planned, and this share has risen notably in
recent years, such that nearly half of all retirees report early exit from the
labor force. The survey also queries respondents on their reasons for early
exits, and many reasons cited in the 2014 survey suggest adverse conse-
quences for standards of living. For example, 61 percent cited health prob-
lems or disability, 22 percent noted work-related reasons including ﬁrm
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downsizing and closure, and 18 percent cited having to care for a family
member. In other words, many people do a poor job planning for the many
contingencies that end up affecting their ability to continue working at
older ages.
This poor planning manifests itself in an even larger gap between the
share of workers reporting that they intend to continue working for pay in
retirement and the share that actually does so. Figure 4.3 shows that roughly
two-thirds of people currently working expect to continue working for pay in
retirement, up from 55 percent in 1998. Yet the share of retirees that
actually does work for pay has been relatively steady over time, at close to
25 percent. Reasons people cite for planning on working for pay post-
retirement relate to their enjoyment of working, their desire to stay active,
and their wanting extra spending money. Some people may ﬁnd they simply
do not need to work, or alternatively that poor health or care needs for a
loved one can outweigh the beneﬁts of working or make it infeasible. In any
event, there appears to be a decline in the value of investments, as some cite
the need for more money to make ends meet as a reason they plan to
continue working.
Changing Generational Experience
Another explanation for the large gap between the share of people saying
they will retire later and the share actually doing so is that the retirement
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Figure 4.2 Workers are retiring earlier than planned (%, 2 yr avg.)
Source: EBRI (2014b).
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experience may be evolving rapidly across cohorts. Changes in pension
coverage, asset returns, and labor market conditions may imply past retirees
will be more ﬁnancially comfortable and secure than future retirees, which
is reﬂected in the plans of current workers. Ultimately, people save to
smooth their consumption over their lifetimes, so data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CES) on per capita household spending across age
groups can shed light on the well-being of current and future retirees (BLS
2014).
The CES conﬁrms that there are important generational disparities, with
older households realizing larger gains in their standards of living in recent
decades compared to younger households, particularly in the aftermath of
the Great Recession. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4 show the evolution of average
real per capita household consumption spending by age of the head of
household between 1984 and 2012. All households saw an increase in
average real levels of spending since 1984, but the largest gain (by a notable
margin) was among households age 75+, who saw a 66 percent gain in real
spending since 1984 versus a 6 percent gain for households age 35–44. In
1984, the level of per capita spending had a hump-shaped life cycle pattern
rising between the ages of 25 and 64, then falling back as households aged
and presumably engaged in more household production in place of out-of-
pocket spending. This may also reﬂect gaps in consumption insurance
15
25
35
45
55
65
75
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
(%
)
Year
Current workers expecting to work for pay in retirement
Retirees working for pay
Figure 4.3 Most workers expect to work for pay, but few retirees do
Source: EBRI (2014b).
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among the elderly. By contrast, in 2012, average per capita spending rose in
a nearly linear fashion with age, falling back moderately for households age
75+. Disparities across age groups have also grown: in 1984, households
spending the most were the 55–64 group who spent 17.5 percent more
than the lowest spending cohort (age 25–34). In 2012, the biggest spenders
TABLE 4.1 Older households doing well
Real per capita spending
Age of head of
household
2012 vs. 1984
(% change)
2012 vs. 2007
(% change)
1984 level
($ 2009)
2012 level
($ 2009)
25–34 15 4 14,550 16,691
35–44 6 15 15,164 16,111
45–54 28 2 16,916 21,697
55–64 46 5 17,105 24,992
65–74 58 0 15,237 24,090
75+ 66 1 12,703 21,086
Source: BLS (2014).
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were still those age 55–64, but they spent 55.1 percent more than the lowest
spenders (now age 35–44). Whereas the 1984 data suggest good but not
perfect consumption smoothing across generations, the 2012 data are more
suggestive of outright generational inequalities in living standards.
When it comes to ﬁnancing consumption, CES data offer a different
picture from some of the trends depicted by the RCS. Figure 4.5 shows the
erosion of support from public and private pensions, even within already-
retired cohorts. Households where the head is age 75+ continue to rely on
pensions for two-thirds of their income on average; by contrast, households
age 65–74 have seen that share decline from the late 1990s level of 60
percent in recent years. Given trends in pension coverage and the tendency
of DB pensions to implement reforms that made the largest cuts to the
youngest participants, the share of household income from traditional
pensions is likely to continue to fall for future retirees. In contrast to the
RCS, however, the CES shows a marked increase in the share of household
income coming from work for pay among households age 65–74, from
about 30 percent in the 1980s to almost 45 percent in recent years (see
Figure 4.6). This could reﬂect later retirements among the younger tail of
the age group, an increase in work for pay after retirement, or both. Thus
the CES presents less of a tension between reported trends in worker
expectations for retirement and the recent behavior of retirees.
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Older households were not immune to the leveraging that brought the
US economy to the brink of disaster in 2008–09. Traditionally, one of the
simplest retirement plans had been for homeowners to pay off their mort-
gages prior to retirement, thereby lowering their income needs without
changing their standards of living. Figure 4.7 shows that the share of house-
holds approaching or entering retirement age with mortgages was small and
fairly stable through the late 1990s, but it jumped in the 2000s. For older
workers, ﬁxed mortgage obligations against falling home values likely
impacted their ability to retire and downsize, and this implied more hard-
ship and replanning for those who experienced job loss. Most recently, the
CES showed a decline in the share of households age 55–64 with mortgages,
likely reﬂecting a renewed emphasis on paying off ﬁxed obligations. The fall
in the share of households holding mortgages was also mirrored in the
younger age groups, as both foreclosure and falling homeownership rates
contributed to a decline in household leverage. In other words, retirement
replanning seems to be underway, as households adjust to riskier economic
realities than presumed prior to the Great Recession.
On balance, the CES results agree with the changing retirement landscape
captured in the RCS. Additionally, they reﬂect that changes are already
underway with a combination of later retirement and/or work for pay taking
the place of declining pensions among the younger half of older households.
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Shocking Experiences
Evidence from the RCS and CES also conﬁrms that more people will want to
continue working at their career jobs longer and work for pay in some
capacity, even after they consider themselves to be retired from a ‘main’
job. Yet the RCS also highlights that people do not always have a choice
about executing their plans and may be forced into early retirement.
Another data source, the Current Population Survey (CPS), conﬁrms that
older workers have experienced considerable unemployment and under-
employment in recent years. For instance, older workers who lose their
jobs face greater difﬁculty ﬁnding employment than comparably qualiﬁed,
or even less-qualiﬁed, younger workers. The implication is that workers
must factor considerable uncertainty about their ability to work later in life
into their planning process, rather than assume they can work as long as
they want.
Also, older workers are not insulated from the business cycle. Figure 4.8
shows the unemployment rate for older men, which rises and falls with the
rest of the economy. Indeed, in some respects, older workers arguably fared
worse than others during the most recent downturn. The unemployment
rate for all workers peaked at 10 percent in October 2009 at the height of the
Great Recession, falling short of its prior peak in 1982 of 10.8 percent.
However the unemployment rate for men age 55–64 set an all-time high
of 8.0 percent in 2010, easily surpassing its prior peak of 6.2 percent in 1983.
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The experience of men age 65+ relative to prior cycles was even worse; their
unemployment rate peaked at 7.1 percent in 2012, nearly 3 percentage
points above their 1983 peak of 4.3 percent. While the unemployment
rate was consistently lower for older male workers than the population
average, older worker groups had the worst unemployment experience
during the Great Recession in post-WWII history. It is therefore unlikely
that even the most prudent planners among this age group could have
anticipated the likelihood of experiencing an unemployment shock. The
story is much the same for older women (Figure 4.9); although their
unemployment rates were lower than men’s on an absolute basis, they
experienced by far the worst degree of unemployment in the post-WWII
period.
Fortunately, unemployment rates have been coming down rapidly in
recent years, but for some groups, they remain at or above prior recessionary
peaks. The persistence of unemployment among older workers highlights
the difﬁculty older workers tend to experience in ﬁnding work once
unemployed. Moreover, the unemployment rate understates the severity
of underemployment among older workers. Figure 4.10 shows the degree
of discouragement among persons age 55+: this is deﬁned as the percent of
the population that has given up looking for work and hence is not counted
as unemployed, but wants a job and would work if one were available.
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Figure 4.9 Unemployment rates by age for women. Unemployment is still elevated
among older women
Source: BLS (2014).
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Discouragement rates rose rapidly during the Great Recession and, like the
unemployment rate, made progress but remain quite elevated.
Another group of under-employed individuals are people employed in
part-time positions who would prefer full-time work. This ‘shadow’ labor
force has been frequently cited by Federal Reserve Board Chairs as a
headwind to the recovery and a reason the unemployment rate under-
states the degree of labor market slack. Workers of all ages have experi-
enced large amounts of under-employment by this metric, and in fact
older workers have fared relatively better in a cyclical sense as the share
of involuntary part-time employment remains below prior recessionary
peaks. Nonetheless, given that unemployment rates remain above the
norms of prior expansions, the 0.5 percent of discouraged workers, and
about 1 percentage point of involuntary part-time workers, suggests that a
nontrivial minority of older households continues to experience reduc-
tions in consumption. Of course, younger workers too experienced shocks
that will have long-term impacts on expectations and retirement plans.
The good news is that households have developed prudence and are
remaining less inclined to take on debt as the recovery has proceeded.
The bad news is that this is a somewhat self-limiting process that has
slowed down the recovery.
Conclusion
The retirement reality is changing rapidly because those close to retirement
will enjoy less support from pensions and face greater investment and labor
market risk to ﬁnance their consumption needs at older ages. As a result,
current workers report plans to retire later and continue working for pay in
retirement, and recent data conﬁrm their plans.
More effective retirement planning will require that workers prepare
better, rather than try and turn the clock back to a level of retirement
support that the US economy can no longer afford. Saving and consumption
decisions must acknowledge the possibility of economic downturns and
unemployment, volatility in investment returns, and the vulnerabilities
implied by entering retirement with ﬁxed debt obligations. Some simple
rules of thumb may be helpful in this regard, including paying off the
mortgage prior to retirement, having a year of disposable income in cash
to navigate unanticipated unemployment, and deﬁning a certain multiple of
household income that should be saved to ﬁnance consumption spending,
depending on one’s planned retirement age. US workers have shown an
ability to adapt through the Great Recession, so we anticipate that retire-
ment preparedness is not an impossible goal.
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Endnote
1. For more detail on the Retirement Conﬁdence Survey, see the Employee Beneﬁt
Research Institute’s website: <http://ebri.org/surveys/rcs>.
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